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Actuality and Necessity: Rereading Spinoza from a Modal Perspective1 
 
 
As noted by Bergson, every great philosopher is possessed with a simple yet original intuition 
that makes their thoughts singular. In Baruch Spinoza's case, his original intuition was that 
everything true is also actual and necessary. His puzzling prima facie assertions in the Ethica, 
that God is identical with Nature, and that our minds are embedded in God's attribute of 
absolute thinking, etc., are all best understood as the unfolding of this fundamental intuition. 
As Spinoza remains an anomaly in the history of occidental philosophy, his writings are all the 
more inviting today for their unusual contentions, which challenge our thinking. 
 
 
1 Determinism and Necessitarianism 
 
We usually apply the term determinism to Spinoza's system. However, this is not exact, and 
may be false, for his position is something more than determinism. We may call it 
necessitarianism, though not without qualifications, as we shall see later. Suppose you are a 
determinist and find yourself arriving safe at the airport after a turbulent flight. You will say 
you were lucky. Your determinist creed will not hinder you from imagining factors that might 
have caused your plane to crash on the way. Having narrowly escaped disaster, you will say 
that an unhappy case was possible. Causal determinism believes that there exists an unbroken 
causal chain in which every event is the immediate consequence of the prior events that 
determine events to happen by causal necessity. However, this necessity, as noted by Leibniz, 
is nothing more than a hypothetical necessity.2 Metaphysically, the causal chain A that comes 
down to your safe arrival is not the only one possible. Some other chain B that leads to a 
disaster seems to be equally possible. Deterministic chains A and B are equally possible, so 
that one cannot tell why A occurred rather than B. So a determinist has no scruples in saying 
that he was lucky, for he is not contradicting himself by imagining an alternative deterministic 
chain in which things could have been otherwise. 
What Spinoza rules out is this metaphysical possibility that things could have been 
                                            
1 Based on Osamu Ueno, “Genjitsusei to Hitsuzensei – Spinoza wo yohsohteki kanten kara yominaosu” 
[Actuality and Necessity – Rereading Spinoza from a Modal Point of View], Philosophy (Tetsugaku), No.57, 
2006, pp.77-92, and rewritten in English for the present version.  
2 Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Discours de métaphysique, 13. 
26   Osamu UENO 
otherwise. Spinoza, a decided necessitarian, would assert the contrary: the alternative you 
imagined was simply impossible, and this is why your plane did not crash. Consider the 
proposition in the first part of his Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata: 
 
Things could have been produced by God in no other way, and in no other order than 
they have been produced.3 
 
In our example, the only possible causal chain was A, the actual one, and none other was 
possible. If your plane did not crash, it is because it was impossible for it to crash. This 
amounts to saying that the actual world is the only possible world. What is characteristic of 
Spinoza's thought and makes it distinct from any other deterministic system is the total 
annihilation of possible worlds other than the actual. 
It is no surprise that the Amsterdam philosopher has been repellent to many for this 
unusual tenet, which goes against our modal intuition that things could have been otherwise. 
Even those who might feel easy accepting Spinoza's pantheistic picture will not readily submit 
to such an all-encompassing hard necessitarianism. And yet there is much reason to think that 
his whole system is working according to this unusual modal tenet. Was Spinoza 
modality-blind? Of course not. Then, how could Spinoza come to affirm that things we believe 
to be contingent are in fact necessary and that alternatives are plainly impossible? 
 
 
2 Necessity as the intrinsic trait of truth 
 
It is helpful to examine the procedure by which Spinoza comes to identify being true with 
being necessary in the Tractatus Intellectus Emendatione. Spinoza adheres to the Cartesian 
principle that true knowledge must be certain and indubitable. Descartes, from youth onward, 
had an ardent zeal for distinguishing absolute certainty from moral certainty, in order to 
isolate the former as requisite for philosophical truth. By way of example, he stated: "Those 
who have never been in Rome have no doubt that it is a town in Italy, even though it could be 
the case that everyone who has told them this has been deceiving them." Belief of this kind has 
only moral certainty, and, though practical in everyday life, has no right to be ranked among 
philosophical truth. In contrast, absolute certainty arises, "When we believe that it is wholly 
impossible that something should be otherwise than we judge it to be." Mathematical 
                                            
3 E 1p33. As for the difference between causal determinism and necessitarianism, see Elhanan Yakira, Contrainte, 
nécessité, choix. La métaphysique de la liberté chez Spinoza et chez Leibniz , Éditions du Grand Midi, Zürich, 
1989, pp.15-31; Don Garrett, 'Spinoza's Necessitarianism', in: Yirmiyahu Yovel (ed.), God and Nature: Spinoza's 
Metaphysics, Brill, 1991, pp.191-3. 
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demonstrations have certainty of this kind, "For we see clearly that it is impossible that two 
and three added together should make more or less than five; or that a square should have only 
three sides, and so on." According to Descartes, philosophical truths must meet this standard.4 
Spinoza sides with Descartes in conceiving of truth as "certain and indubitable 
knowledge." But unlike Descartes, who opens up a universal doubt and calls upon divine 
sincerity to establish what we perceive clearly and distinctly as truth, his quest starts out from 
the primitive fact that we have already been given a certain number of true ideas, such as in 
mathematics. How do I know that what I know is true? In order for me to know, it is not 
necessary to know that I know, much less necessary to know that I know that I know. For to 
know that I know, I must first know. There is no sign of certainty except the objective essence 
of a thing that we perceive. In effect, certainty and an objective essence are the same thing, so 
that, "For the certainty of the truth, no other sign is needed than having a true idea." But how 
do I know that it is really the objective essence that I perceive? Only a "reflective knowledge" 
of the true idea will show the requisite quality. It is not the denominatio extrinseca or the 
agreement with its object that, by itself, makes an idea true, as the agreement could be mere 
coincidence. Something more is needed to make the agreement necessary, which must be 
intrinsic to the true idea. Spinoza calls this something denominatio intrinseca, or the intrinsic 
trait that designates an idea as a true idea.5 The most important part of the Tractatus Intellectus 
Emendatione concerns this intrinsic trait, the form of true thought. Spinoza invites skeptics to 
observe the difference between a true idea and an idea ficta, or fictive idea. Skeptics say that 
things might be otherwise than we believe, but this can be the case only for fictive ideas. For 
the true idea concerns necessary things, of which being otherwise is impossible, while the 
fictive idea concerns only possible and not necessary or impossible things.6 Consider the 
following: 
 
I call a thing impossible whose nature implies that it would be contradictory for it to 
exist; necessary whose nature implies that it would be contradictory for it not to exist; 
and possible whose existence, by its very nature, does not imply a contradiction--either 
for it to exist or for it not to exist--but whose necessity or impossibility of existence 
depends on causes unknown to us, so long as we feign its existence. So if its necessity 
or impossibility, which depends on external causes, were known to us, we would have 
                                            
4 René Descartes, Regulae ad directionem ingenii, AT X, p.362; René Descartes, Principes de la philosophie AT 
IX, p.324. We follow the suggestion of the editors Adam and Tannery that the phrases inserted by Pico in the 
French translation were probably approved by Descartes. Cf. AT IX, Avertissement, p.X. Ibid. IV 205, AT IX, 
p.323. We do not go into the distinction Descartes makes between certainty of the Cogito and mathematical 
certainty. See on this issue Osamu Ueno, “The Certainty of the Cogito: A Modal Perspective,” Philosophia Osaka, 
No.1, 2006, pp.1-12. 
5 Cf. TIE 69-71. 
6 TIE 52. 
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been able to feign nothing concerning it.7 
 
By way of example, you can doubt "Peter's" visit so long as you can feign either that he is 
going home or that he is coming to visit you. Even if your imagination turns out to be true, this 
is only a fluke.8 On the contrary, you cannot feign either that you exist or that you do not exist. 
Nor, having known the nature of God, can you feign either the existence or nonexistence of 
God. The necessity of things eliminates the possibility of their being otherwise than we judge 
them to be. Let there be an omniscient being who knows every truth of "Peter's" existence. He 
surely can feign nothing.9 This shows that, "The less the mind understands and the more things 
it perceives, the greater its power of feigning is; and the more things it understands, the more 
that power is diminished." So those who interpret a true idea as one that is in doubt are 
confusing it with a fictive idea, or otherwise they are just pretending something impossible to 
be possible, even though there is nothing that cannot be put into words.10 This also reveals the 
nature of false ideas. For between fictitious and false ideas there is no other difference except 
that the latter suppose assent,11 i.e., you assent to P without noticing that P is impossible. So 
when things appear sub specie necessitatis, or under the aspect of necessity, the false is thereby 
revealed to be false. We are now at the crux of the matter. According to Spinoza, the trait of 
truth intrinsic to an idea is nothing but the necessity it contains. A true idea shows the necessity 
of a thing to be so, and the certainty we have is this necessary thinking itself. This is what the 
famous phrase of the Ethica conveys: "As the light makes both itself and the darkness plain, so 
truth is the standard both of itself and of the false."12 
 
 
3 Nature-God 
 
Reflexive knowledge of true ideas takes Spinoza to his ontological contention that truth, 
existence and actuality become one sub specie necessitatis. The whole concern of the Ethica is 
to demonstrate this congruent whole that he refers to as "God or Nature" (Deus seu Natura). 
The point is to show that it is necessary for God to exist and that God is the only existing 
substance encompassing everything: the omne esse, or the whole being13 beyond which there 
is no being. His definition of God encompasses this sole aim: "By God I understand a being 
                                            
7 TIE 53. 
8 TIE 52. 
9 TIE 54. 
10 TIE 58, 59. 
11 TIE 66. 
12 E 2p43s. 
13 TIE 76. 
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absolutely infinite, i.e., a substance consisting of an infinity of attributes, of which each one 
expresses an eternal and infinite essence."14 God is the absolute substance that everything else 
must be conceived through as its mode. It is expressed in an infinite number of attributes — 
among which are the attribute of Thought and the attribute of Extension — so that whatever 
follows necessarily from the Divine nature is infinitely duplicated in God, according to the 
attributes. This parallelism follows: "The order and connection of ideas is the same as the order 
and connection of things."15 This brings into conception what we may call an absolute truth 
space where every idea in the attribute of Thought agrees necessarily with its object in all the 
attributes, and therefore is necessarily true. Hence the mighty corollary: 
 
From this it follows that God's [NS: actual] power of thinking is equal to his actual 
power of acting. I.e., whatever follows formally from God's infinite nature follows 
objectively in God from his idea in the same order and with the same connection.16 
 
This implies two points:  
 
1) That there is nothing contingently true, and that if there is anything true, it is actually and 
necessarily true. Since God's "actual power of thinking" parallels "his actual power of acting," 
the agreement of an idea with its object cannot be contingent. Or rather, they are only two 
different expressions of one and the same thing.17 The entirety of objects ("the face of the 
whole Universe") and the entirety of ideas (the actual infinite intellect of God) agree 
necessarily with each other to form one and the same reality, so that all ideas, insofar as they 
are related to God, are necessarily true.18*   
This amounts to saying that in nature there is nothing contingent, but all things have been 
determined from the necessity of the divine nature to exist and produce an effect in a certain 
way. For if things could have been otherwise, so that the order of Nature could be different, 
then God's nature could also have been other than it is now, and therefore that other nature 
would also have had to exist, and consequently, there could have been two or more Gods, 
which is absurd.19 We see how far Spinoza departs from our more usual idea of God the 
Creator, who chooses a possible world among many, and brings it to actuality. Spinoza's God 
does not bestow actuality on the possible. He is the actuality itself which is the only possible 
world. So the Spinozan God has no idea of a possible non-Rubicon-crossing Caesar in his 
                                            
14 E 1def6. 
15 E 2p7. 
16 E 2p7c. 
17 E 2p7s. 
18 Ep 64, E 2p32.  
19 E 1p33dem. 
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infinite intellect while generating a physical Caesar who crosses the Rubicon. Odd as it may 
sound to someone like Leibniz, it was impossible for Caesar not to cross the Rubicon, and the 
factual truth of Caesar is a necessary truth. This is what conveys the proposition that "God is 
the immanent, not the transitive, cause of all things." Putting it another way, "God must be 
called the cause of all things in the same sense in which he is called the cause of himself."20 
  
2) That our mind is part of God, installed in the absolute truth space that is God. Spinoza 
thinks this explains why every idea that in us is absolute, or adequate and perfect, is true.  
 
When we say that there is in us an adequate and perfect idea, we are saying nothing but 
that...there is an adequate and perfect idea in God insofar as he constitutes the essence 
of our Mind, and consequently...we are saying nothing but that such an idea is true, 
q.e.d.21 
 
This was the answer to the question of reflexive knowledge noted above. If we are given true 
ideas and cannot doubt them, it is because our intellect is part of Divine thinking. It operates 
according to the sole necessity of truth, like a spiritual automaton.22 This may require more 
explanation. 
 
 
4 Three kinds of knowledge 
 
It is well known that Spinoza distinguishes three kinds of human knowledge23:  
1) Knowledge of the first kind, opinion or imagination. 
2) Knowledge of the second kind, reason. 
3) Knowledge of the third kind, intuitive knowledge. 
What is important is that the distinction is not of the faculties of the mind but concerns, instead, 
how much our mind partakes of Divine necessary thinking. The first kind (opinion or 
imagination) does not engage in necessary thinking at all, representing things only as possible 
or contingent. The second kind (reason) perceives something necessarily common to things 
and thereby develops universal knowledge. The third kind (intuitive knowledge) concerns the 
eternal truth of singular things. The last two kinds consider things sub specie aeternitatis, for 
necessity cannot be explained by duration or time. The theory of mind in the Ethics lays the 
foundation for this distinction. 
                                            
20 E 1p18, p25cs. 
21 E 2p34dem. 
22 Expression in TIE 85. 
23 Cf. E 2p40s2. 
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We must be aware that, in Spinoza's system, there is no thinking individuals. The ideas are 
generated as modes of the attribute Thought according to the causal order of things, to form, all 
together, the entire intellect of God. The infinite intellect of God is not like a gigantic Mind but 
is rather an infinite web of ideas, where the idea of a thing a depends on the idea of its cause b, 
and this idea of a thing b depends on the idea of its cause c, and so on, ad infinitum. Remember 
that each idea is a mode of Thought, an act by which God knows. It is not God as infinite but 
God as modified by the idea of the cause b that knows the effect a, for, again, the knowledge of 
a depends on the knowledge of its cause b. In short, God modified by the idea of b perceives a, 
and God modified by the idea of c perceives b, etc.24 In general, a thing is always perceived by 
God as modified locally by the idea of the nearest cause of that thing. Let us call this the rule of 
percept location R. Suppose that our mind is the idea in God of our body, and that the affected 
states of our body are to be known by the knowledge of its nearest cause, i.e., the nature of the 
affecting body and of our affected body. Applying the rule R, we obtain that our mind, which 
is the idea of our body, or more precisely God as modified by the idea of our body, perceives 
partially the affections of the same body as its own.25 The passage below, one of the most 
difficult, can be construed in this sense: 
 
From this it follows that the human Mind is a part of the infinite intellect of God. 
Therefore, when we say that the human Mind perceives this or that, we are saying 
nothing but that God, not insofar as he is infinite, but insofar as he is explained through 
the nature of the human Mind, or insofar as he constitutes the essence of the human 
Mind, has this or that idea; and when we say that God has this or that idea, not only 
insofar as he constitutes the nature of the human Mind, but insofar as he also has the 
idea of another thing together with the human Mind, then we say that the human Mind 
perceives the thing only partially, or inadequately.26 
 
Perception of the affections of our body is related to the last case above. Ideas of affections, 
insofar as they are related to the mind, are "like conclusions without premises," which testify 
to—as they involve the knowledge of the causes—the existence of our body and of the 
affecting bodies, without, however, yielding adequate knowledge of them. For, applying the 
rule R again, it is God, as modified by the ideas of the nearest causes of those bodies, who has 
adequate knowledge of them.27 This inadequate, partial knowledge of affections is the first 
kind of knowledge, opinion or imagination. It is ignorant of causes, hence knows nothing of 
necessity. A child who has seen "Simon" many times in the evening naturally comes to believe 
he will see him tomorrow evening. But he lacks certainty. Once he happens to see "Jacob" 
                                            
24 Cf. E 2p11-13. This interpretation relies on Martial Geroult, Spinoza: l'âme (Ethique, 2), Aubier-Montaigne, 
1974, p.110. 
25 Cf. E 2p16-26. 
26 E 2p11c. 
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instead of "Simon" one evening, his imagination will vacillate and, "He will imagine now this 
one, now that one, with the future evening time, i.e., he will regard neither of them as certainly 
future, but both of them as contingently future." This is how we represent things to be 
contingent.28 
In contrast, it is of the nature of Reason "to regard things as necessary, not as 
contingent."29 Suppose there is A, something common to our body and the affecting body. As 
A is part of the causes of the affection, the knowledge of A is involved in the idea of the same 
affection. Applying the rule R, we obtain that God, insofar as modified solely by the idea of 
our body invested with A, has this knowledge of A involved in the idea of the affection. 
Therefore the knowledge of A is necessarily adequate in our mind. Spinoza calls such 
knowledge "common notions" from which knowledge of the second kind, Reason, arises.30 
Spinoza seems to have in mind hypothetical deduction like, "if p, then necessarily q," which 
serves for discovering nomological necessities in our bodily experience. The difference 
between fictitious ideas and scientific hypotheses is that the latter consists of deduction, and 
deductive knowledge depends on conceptual necessity in counterfactual terms. Spinoza seems 
to be well aware of this difference.31 
While the second kind of knowledge concerns universal laws of nature, the third kind, 
intuitive knowledge, concerns the eternal aspect of singular things. According to Spinoza, to 
conceive things sub specie aeternitatis is to conceive things insofar as they involve existence 
through God's essence.32 But how can we explain this? Arguably, we can accomplish this by 
proceeding along the demonstrations in geometric order we see in the Ethica. 33  These 
demonstrations eventually reveal to us that the eternal truth of the body, proven to exist 
necessarily in God, is our own mind that understands the same demonstrations.34 They also 
show that if we were not the eternal mind demonstrated, we surely could not make sense of 
those demonstrations, as we, in fact, do.35 This is congruent to the scholium in which Spinoza 
alludes to the experience of eternity: "We feel and know by experience that we are eternal," for 
"The eyes of the mind, by which it sees and observes things, are the demonstrations 
                                                                                                                 
27 E 2p28dem. 
28 E 2p44, p44c1s, p31c. 
29 E 2p44. 
30 E 2p37-40, p40s2. 
31 Cf. TIE 19, 28, 101-103. See Osamu Ueno, “Spinoza to shinri” [Spinoza and Truth] in Shinri no tankyuh 
[Recherche de la verité], Chisenshokan, 2005, pp.167-9. 
32 E 5p30dem. 
33 Cf. E 2p40s2: The third kind of knowledge "proceeds from an adequate idea of the formal essence of certain 
attributes of God to the adequate knowledge of the essence of things." 
34 E 5p22, 23. 
35 E 5p31dem. 
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themselves."36 
Be that as it may, Spinoza's whole project of intellectual purgation is relevant in the light 
of modality. As far as our understanding is concerned, "We can want nothing except what is 
necessary, nor absolutely be satisfied with anything except what is true."37 It is not surprising 
that Spinoza rejects the idea of contingent truth. For truth, insofar as it is truth, must for him be 
necessary truth. 
 
 
5 Necessity and a strong notion of actuality 
 
Nevertheless, it may be tempting to join Leibniz in saying that the fact that Caesar crossed the 
Rubicon does not eliminate the possibility that he could have changed his mind. This is 
because a thing, the contrary of which does not involve contradiction, is logically possible, and 
"everything is held to be possible unless it is proven to be impossible."38 Spinoza would 
retaliate by saying that he has proven it to be impossible. You can imagine a 
non-Rubicon-crossing Caesar to be possible only so long as you ignore the contradiction it 
involves. For, if it were possible, another world should also exist, which is tantamount to 
saying that two Gods exist, which is absurd. What is this quarrel all about? 
I think it is about the problem of how to settle with the notion of actuality. Let us go back 
to Descartes. The Leibnizian principle above is also the leading principle of the Cartesian 
doubt. The doubt proceeds by assuming that everything is possible unless it is proven to be 
impossible. By way of example, if it is possibly true that I do not have my body and that 
everything I perceive does not really exist, then there is no obvious reason why it could not be 
so in reality. Cartesian doubt thus loosens our grip on actuality in the sense that, possibly, you 
are mixing up your world or, possibly, you have been dreaming and you do not have such a 
body. You will never know, because any possible world would be an actual world. This 
reflects a certain inflation of the notion of actuality in our possible-world discussion and, 
arguably, that is why Leibniz had to resort to a principle totally extrinsic to the possible 
worlds: i.e., the choice of the best world by God.39 The reason why this world is the only actual 
                                            
36 E 5p23s. See Osamu Ueno, "Mentis oculi ipsae demonstrationes: jouissance et demonstration dans l'Ethique de 
Spinoza," in Spinoza: puissance et ontologie, Editions Kimé, 1994. 
37 E 4appendix32. 
38 Letter to Countess Elizabeth (?), On God and Formal Logic (1678?) in G. W. Leibniz, Philosophical Essays, 
Edited and Translated by Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber, Hackett Publishing Company Indianapolis & 
Cambridge,1989, II.A.1 p. 237. 
39  The possible worlds should not contain in temselves any information about  God’s choice of the best world. Cf. 
Robert Merrihew Adams, Leibniz - Determinist, Theist, Idealist, Oxford University Press, 1994, p.15. 
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world among many is that it is the best world chosen by God. But what if this choice was 
necessary, for God surely could not have chosen a less good option? We know Leibniz tried 
everything to avoid this supposition, which logically entails the impossibility of the 
non-Rubicon-crossing Caesar. From this, a question arises. If being possible is equivalent to 
being true in a possible world, and if a world cannot be proved by its own inhabitants to be the 
best of all, how do we know we are not in a possible world that has never been chosen by God? 
If we want to turn down such a bizarre question, we need a notion of actuality stronger than a 
possibilist notion, which is always associated with possible truth. 
All things considered, we may say that the quest for certainty in the text of Descartes and 
Spinoza, referred to above, concerns this strong notion of actuality. The Cartesian Cogito 
reveals its importance in this light. Descartes discovers an absolute actuality when he comes to 
the impossibility of denying the proposition "I am, I exist." This proposition is, in that sense, 
"necessarily true."40 His originality is clear. Before establishing the possibility of the world, I 
know my actual existence. Unlike every other thing, I cannot feign that I am not. This 
impossibility is the absolute marker of actuality, which is the decisive basis for what is in 
reality. This notion of actuality is so strong that it forces Descartes to determine which possible 
world should be his world. This is why he had to resort to the veracity of God, which, again, is 
a principle totally extrinsic to the possible worlds.41 
Spinoza's necessitarianism also contains a strong notion of actuality, although with a 
different approach. Spinoza would agree with Descartes in that certainty is obtained only when 
the impossibility of the contrary shows up. But according to Spinoza, impossibility arises 
solely from the necessity of truth that eliminates any other possibilities. Though we may not be 
absolutely certain of a factual truth, it is certain that if Caesar truly crossed the Rubicon, it is 
because he had no other possibilities. For God is the only possible world in which Caesar 
moves. God is the all-encompassing necessary whole, in which everything is actual and 
necessarily true. The Spinozan notion of actuality is perhaps the strongest, for it has no need 
for extrinsic principles. 
If actuality and necessity become one in Spinoza's system, we need some qualifications 
for his necessitarianism. We will be mistaken if we think everything is determined beforehand. 
Spinoza's God has no beforehand. If we take seriously his contention that God's actual power 
of thinking is equal to his actual power of acting and that there is, whether finite or infinite, no 
potential intellect but only actual intellect,42 we must admit that the Spinozan God acts and 
thinks actually, here and now. At the same time, a Caesar is determined by the necessity of 
                                            
40 R. Descartes, Meditationes de prima philosophia, AT VII, p.25. 
41 Cf. ibid., The Fifth and Sixth Meditations. 
42 E 2p7c, 1p31c. 
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Divine nature to cross the Rubicon, and the idea of this very same Rubicon-crossing Caesar, 
and of no other Caesar, is generated in the infinite intellect. Arguably, Spinoza denies to God's 
infinite intellect any memoria that represents future things as contingent.43 Foreseeing is 
therefore alien to God, and this is congruent with the contention that, "Nature has no end set 
before it," and that, "All final causes are nothing but human fictions."44 
 
For we have shown... that the necessity of nature from which he acts is the same as that 
from which he exists. The reason, therefore, or cause, why God, or Nature, acts, and the 
reason why he exists, are one and the same. As he exists for the sake of no end, he also 
acts for the sake of no end. Rather, as he has no principle or end of existing, so he also 
has none of acting.45 
 
So, if an omniscient Being pictures, before the Creation, a possible Caesar crossing or not 
crossing the Rubicon, it is not the God of Spinoza. Spinoza's God does not know what will be 
possible until it is actually produced of necessity. The Ethica gives the name of Gloria to the 
sentiment that one feels oneself to be part of this absolute actuality.46 It is up to the readers 
themselves to judge whether this is good news or a terrible announcement of "blind 
necessity."47 
 
 
 
Abbreviations 
 
TIE: Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione with paragraph number. 
E: Ethica ordine geometrico demonstrata 
I: introduction 
def: definition 
p: proposition 
c: corollaire 
dem: demonstration 
s: scolie 
 
                                            
43 For memoria, see E 2p18s. 
44 E 1appendix. 
45 E 4praef. 
46 This absolute actuality confounded with necessity can be construed as Spinozan eternity. Cf. E 5p30dem. See 
also Osamu Ueno, “Hitsuzen, eien, soshite genjitsusei – Spinoza no hitsuzenshugi” [Necessity, Eternity and 
Actuality: Spinoza in light of Necessitarianism], Spinozana, No.6, pp.5-21. 
47 Criticism by Leibniz in the Essais de théodicée, 172.  
36   Osamu UENO 
Ep: Epstolae with numbering in the Gebhardt edition Spinoza Opera, IV. 
 
(English translation by Edwin Curley: The Collected Works of Spinoza (volume I), 
Princeton University Press, 1985.) 
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